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Foreword: Verstehen and Dispute Resolution
John B. Attanasio *
Over time, people have developed a variety of techniques to
resolve disputes through means other than violence.1 On both
national and international planes, some of these techniques have
been promulgated into law. For example, in the international
sphere, some of the established norms of diplomacy have involved
dispute resolution.2
The British and American judicial systems have adopted an
adversarial approach to dispute resolution. Essentially, this entails
each party before a court putting forward her most powerful arguments-within certain ethical boundaries such as honesty-and
having a judge or jury decide who wins.' Not all courts follow this
model. For example, German courts impose much stronger obligations on lawyers to function as officers of the court in helping
judges to ferret out the truth, apply appropriate substantive legal
principles, and resolve the disputes.4
Courts afford only one method of dispute resolution, although one upon which American lawyers have relied to the neglect of others. This point can be exaggerated, however: while
American court dockets continue to swell,' most cases do not go
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1 Some of these, such-as diplomacy or trials, often operate against the backdrop of
a threat of violence.
2 Se4 e.g., LEO KANOWITz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 909-90 (1986).
3 See generally FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 4-8

(3d. ed. 1985).
4 See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan et. al., Phases of German Civil Procedure I & II, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 1193 (1958). This contrast should not be drawn too sharply, however, as recent
reforms in both the German and American systems have drawn each closer to the other.
See Arthur T. von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflections on First Instance Civil Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure and in the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L REV. 609

(1988).
5 See KANOWiTZ, supra note 2, at 7.
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to trial. For example, recent statistics in the federal courts indicate
that as few as five percent of all federal lawsuits proceed to trial;
and pretrial motions resolve approximately thirty-five percent of all
pretrial litigation.6 These developments suggest that American
lawyers have embraced alternatives to ,the adversarial model. They
often resolve disputes by negotiation-perhaps against the backdrop or with the spur of litigation. This alleviation of the stark
Hegelian clash of the adversarial system may be partly attributable
to the high costs of litigation7 or to the increasing impatience of
courts with parties who are pressing weak claims or
overburdened
8
defenses.
Some of these changes, however, may have been catalyzed by
a growing movement in the academy called Alternative Dispute
Resolution ("ADR"). 9 Understandably, calling this approach alternative dispute resolution has offended some of its proponents.
Many scholars and practitioners in this growing area think of what
they do as dispute resolution, with judicial process serving as one
alternative. Supporting this proposition, courts themselves have
incorporated many ADR techniques in their management of cas10
es.
While lawyers have a monopoly on representing people before
courts," they do not have a monopoly on dispute resolution.
Many other professionals including diplomats, social workers, police officers, politicians, and counsellors in various areas, all routinely engage in dispute resolution. Indeed, the very point of this
Symposium is to bring together scholars from various areas of
dispute resolution who normally do not talk with each other.
To lay some groundwork for the ensuing discussion, I would
like to sketch one fairly simple typology of dispute resolution.

6 See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv.
494, 511-12 (1986). Indeed, the number of cases going to trial has declined dramatically
in recent years. Id.
7 See A. Leo Levine & Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37
RUTGERS L. REv. 219, 248-51 (1985).
8 See, e.g., Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material
Change in Standards?, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 770 (1988); Melissa Nelkin, Sanctions Under
Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and
Punishment, 74 GEO. LJ. 1313 (1986).
9 Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424 (1986); Frank FA. Sander, Alternative Methods of
Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. (1985).
10 Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63 NoTRE DAME L.

REV. 818 (1988).
11

See generally KANOWITZ, supra note 2, at 7-10, 33-38.

19921

FOREWORD - VERSTEHEN

Then I would like to briefly explore the basics of Max Weber's
concept of Verstehen that may help to inform dispute resolution,
particularly in certain parts of this typology.
I.

ADJUDICATION, ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND NEGOTIATION

Anyone interested in describing the realm of dispute resolution would include adjudication, arbitration, mediation, and negotiation." More controversial is focusing on only these- as legitimate areas of dispute resolution. After all, one could claim that
psychiatric counseling involves a sort of preventive dispute resolution. When a psychiatrist counsels an alcoholic and helps to avert
a marital dispute, one could argue that the psychiatrist engages in
dispute resolution, or at. least prevention.
With specific regard to governmental institutions, one might
argue that dispute resolution involves not only courts, but also
legislative and executive bodies. For example, one might argue
that when a legislative body decides whether to give a special
capital gains rate of taxation for investment profits, it is resolving
a dispute among the various members of society who would favor
or oppose such a tax break. In more general terms, it is resolving
a dispute about the generation and distribution of societal wealth.
Ideally, the legislature should approximate the confluence of societal opinions in how to resolve the dispute.
One might try to describe the resultant legislation as a kind
of negotiation writ large. This is a bit of a stretch, and in any
event, I would like to focus on the more traditional, micro-level
view of dispute resolution. While one might try to add to or subtract from adjudication, arbitration, mediation and negotiation, I
think that these four categories aptly describe the impressions of
what both lay people and lawyers typically have in mind when they
talk about dispute resolution.
In a fairly widely practiced form of dispute resolution, one of
the parties to the dispute brings the matter to a court or an administrative body. Such a tribunal generally has the jurisdiction-which comes from the Latin jurisdictio, meaning power-to

12 With the exception of adjudication, lawyers and nonlawyers labor in each of these
areas. Nonlawyers are also extensively engaged in adjudication as experts. See, e.g., Bernard L. Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, 3 ARCHIVES CRIM. PSYCHODYNAMICS
221 (1959), reprinted in DAVID W. LOUIsELL Er. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING
AND PROCEDURE 938 (6th ed. 1989).
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summon all parties to a dispute before it.'" The tribunal can
then resolve the disagreement and enforce its decision whether
any of the parties to the conflict like this resolution or not.
Courts and administrative agencies have. established rules
about what procedures 14 and substantive law they will use to resolve the dispute.' 5 Parties to a dispute who have chosen a judicial or administrative tribunal have limited influence in picking
the specific adjudicator who will resolve their dispute. 6 In some.
jurisdictions, particularly in the United States, parties in court may
have the option to try their case to a jury, which is a group of
ordinary citizens assembled for the purpose of resolving the dispute.' 7 The judge still presides over the case and rules on questions of procedural and substantive law. Within these boundaries,
the jury resolves the dispute. Often, procedural rules permit the
parties substantial sway over who will be the jurors.1 8 Consequently, the influence of the parties in a court case may be greatest
when they try the case before a jury.
Parties to a dispute who have selected a judicial or administrative tribunal must generally abide by the procedural rules of
that tribunal. At times, these rules afford the parties some power
to modify certain rules by agreement.19 The dispute resolution
13 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
14 For example, the federal trial courts in the United States use the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure supplemented by local rules for individual districts. Federal appellate
courts use the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. State courts in the United States
apply separate sets of rules. Federal and state administrative tribunals apply yet other sets
of rules. For instance, the procedures followed by the administrative tribunals of the Social Security Administration are specified in 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3128 (1988), as well as the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1988).
15 For example, in common law systems, statutes, administrative regulations, and judicial interpretations of these all take precedence over judge-made law. In the American
system, the law of the national government takes precedence over law promulgated by
the states. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. In civil law systems, courts look to codes; they
are not bound by judicial precedents. When interstate disputes arise in federal systems or
international disputes arise, courts and administrative tribunals look to conflict of laws
principles to determine which substantive rules apply. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICt OF LAWS (1967).
16 Some jurisdictions select which judge will adjudicate a particular case by lot. Even
in these jurisdictions, however, there may be limited power in some cases to change
venue to a district in which there are few trial judges so as to limit the possibilities.
17 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a jury trial in
criminal cases and the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right in civil cases when the
amount in controversy exceeds $20.
18 Under federal civil practice in the United States, parties can challenge jurors for
cause and can challenge a limited number without cause. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET.
AL., CML PROCEDURE 519-25 (1985).
19 See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 6(d) (allowing parties to modify many time periods speci-
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procedures followed by a court are often formal and ritualistic;
however, the practice can vary markedly with the jurisdiction and
the particular judge. Administrative proceedings can be somewhat
less formal than judicial ones. A judicial or administrative tribunal
might also require the parties to observe government promulgated
substantive law. Alternatively, it may allow the parties to a contract,
for example, to create their own substantive rules, or to modify
pre-existing bodies of substantive rules. 2 'Courts and administrative tribunals tend to be powerful actors that can in some degree
level the playing field for conflict resolution. One cost of this
leveling is less flexibility.
Arbitration is a second form of dispute resolution. In contrast
to many judicial or administrative proceedings, the parties often
select their own arbitrator or arbitrators. The parties may employ
a variety of techniques to do this. For example, they may adopt
certain methods and criteria for selecting arbitrators, perhaps
narrowing the field to arbitrators associated with a particular organization. Arbitrations are less formal than judicial or administrative
proceedings, although the degree of formality can vary considerably depending on the arbitrator. Normally, the parties agree in
advance that the decision of the arbitrator will be binding even if
they do not like the result.
Parties can put the case to the arbitrator and then contractually agree to accept the arbitrator's decision after she has issued
it. This approach may, however, more closely resemble mediation,
another dispute resolution technique discussed below. In addition
to selecting the arbitrator, parties to an arbitration will generally
select the procedural and substantive rules that will apply to the
dispute. Again, this is easier to accomplish before any dispute
actually occurs after which the selection of procedures can become
highly result-oriented.
Negotiation is a third dispute resolution technique. In this
process, the parties discuss how to resolve the dispute among
themselves, perhaps using legal counsel or other representatives.
Rather than an adjudicator deciding the case, the parties them-

fled in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
20 See, eg., M/S Bremen and Unterweser Reederei v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1 (1972) (upholding forum selection clause that deprived a federal court of jurisdiction
over a dispute between citizens of different countries).
21 For further discussion of arbitration, see FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKouR1,
How ARBrrRATION WORKS (4th ed. 1985).
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selves agree to the resolution. They may memorialize their agreement in a contract that will be enforceable by a judge or an arbitrator. If both parties are sovereigns, they may memorialize their
agreement in a treaty that will likely be more difficult to enforce.
As there is no intermediary in negotiation, the parties themselves
must resolve their disagreements. Success requires considerable
cooperation and good will on both sides. It also requires an unemotional awareness of the overriding benefits of agreement to
overcome the disagreements that predictably arise.
Points of negotiation may include results, substantive rules to
be applied in reaching those results, and procedural approaches
used to consider the dispute. Procedurally, parties to a negotiation
may argue over such issues as where the negotiation will take
place, who will participate, how long and in what order each can
speak, and even the shape of the table at which the parties will
sit.
As with arbitration, negotiating procedural rules is easiest to
accomplish before specific disputes present themselves. At this
point in time, parties are somewhat less likely to be result-oriented
in specifying procedures simply because they have more difficulty
predicting which procedural rules will lead to which results. Procedures always relate in important ways with the content of substantive rights. Parties recognize this. Consequently, they often seek to
gain substantive advantages or to scuttle negotiations altogether
using procedural arguments. Particularly if this is done excessively,
jockeying for procedural advantage can undercut the trust which is
so important for successful negotiation. This method of dispute
resolution requires an agreement of the parties or contract at the
end of the day. Posturing on procedural rights can also obfuscate
substance, and focusing on substance in a rational way with as
little pettiness and emotion as possible is often what resolves disputes. When there is considerable distrust between the parties,
negotiation can be a difficult approach. In such cases, some neutral third party may have to serve as a judge, an arbitrator, or at
22
least a mediator.
Mediation is a fourth method of dispute resolution. This
method combines some of the elements of other dispute resolution techniques already discussed. Like court litigation and arbitration, mediation brings into the dispute a third party. Like negotia-

22 For further discussion of negotiation, see ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING
To YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1983).
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tion, however, the parties must agree on any resolution of the
dispute. The mediator's decisions are not binding. Instead, the
mediator serves as a neutral third party who will try to facilitate
agreement.
A mediator may use a variety of methods to facilitate agreement. The mediator might simply converse with the parties, perhaps to. nudge the parties into thinking more clearly about their
positions, or the mediator may offer her own observations. The
mediator may actually draft agreements based on her conversations with the parties, they can then choose whether to sign this
proposed agreement. Proposals put forward by a mediator might
go through a number of drafts before the parties can actually
agree to them.2 3 Certain mediators may have some power to
force agreement and subsequently to enforce the agreement. An
example would be a powerful international actor. Such a mediator
can be the initiator and prime mover of 24bringing the parties to
the table and even to eventual agreement.
II.

MAX

WEBER, RATIONALITY, AND VERSTEH-EN

Max Weber, one of the founders of modem sociology, was a
most astute observer of human behavior. Among his many areas of
interest was law.' One of the overarching themes of Weber's
writings on law is the rationalization of legal authority. 26 For him,
what distinguishes law from morality or convention is a specialized
enforcement staff that administers the law.27
Weber spoke of the ascendancy of legal rational authority
descriptively. Normatively, he viewed the growing predominance of
rationality with considerable ambivalence, sometimes praising it
and sometimes lamenting it.2" Still, the rational systematization of
law decreased the exercise of arbitrary power and elevated the
rule of law over the rule of human beings. In this way, the law

23
24

See id. at 171-73.
For further discussion of mediation, see ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, INTERNA-

TIONAL MEDIATION: A WORKING GUIDE (1978); FRANK F.A. SANDER, MEDIATION: A SELEcTED ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1984).
25 For further discussion of Weber's observations on legal phenomena, see ANTHONY

T. KRoNMAN, MAX WEBER (1983).
26 Id. at 4.
27 Id. at 30.
28 Id at 56. While Weber .iews the rational systematization of modem legal systems
as freeing them from arbitrary decisions, he also views the increasing bureaucratization
entailed as shackling human creativity and autonomy. Id. at 166-88.
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could grow more fair in regulating the behavior of all citizens,
9
including the law giver.
For Weber, the concept of rationality is inherent to, and indeed interchangeable with, the formalization and systematization
of the law?' At times, he described formalization as simply government by general rules of law. At other times, he ascribed to
formalization such characteristics as the "independence or selfcontainedness" of the legal system." He also placed great importance on the "comprehensiveness and organizational clarity" of the
legal order." Indeed, his formal, systematic, rational view of law
prompted him to criticize the common law system as being somewhat primitive. It did not convey the calculability that Weber
thought so important to facilitate market economics. The common
law doctrine of stare decisis ameliorated some of these difficulties33 as did the identification of the English bar with commercial
34
interests.
Weber saw a great divide between highly formalistic, rationalized forms of justice, and more ad hoc forms of arbitration practiced on the household level in more primitive societies. For him,
the limited utility of ad hoc arbitration was largely confined to
resolving disputes among people who are familiar with each other,
such as the members of a household. Particularly when practiced
on impersonal levels, dispute resolution had to be formalized and
systematized.3 5
As Weber's highly rationalistic approach criticizes even common law adjudication, it would appear to reject-or at least be
more deeply critical of-the noncourt models of dispute resolution
discussed in the previous section. Essentially, he would seem to
argue for greater systematization of arbitration, at least by stricter
adherence to the principle of stare decisis.
While I note Weber's views on rationality for background, I
am not suggesting either that court adjudication in common law
systems or arbitration be more formalized, systematized, or rationalized. I am primarily interested in the applicability of another

29 Id. at 56.
30 Id. at 78.
31 Id. at 92.
32 Id. at 89.
33 Id.
34 See id. at 120-24; see also MAX WEBER, SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION 352-57 (Walter
G. Runcimin ed. & E. Matthews trans., 1978).
35 See KRONMAN, supra note 25, at 98.
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concept in Weber to negotiation and mediation. This concept is
Verstehcn. In German, Verstehen means "to understand." 6 Weber
would view mediation .and negotiation as less systematic forms of
dispute resolution which are less advanced than formal, rational
bureaucracies-particularly when dispute resolution is impersonal
and not among members of the same household. 7 Nevertheless,
if one accepts the validity of these other methods of dispute resolution, Verstehen can render their methodologies more precise.
Verstehen is central to Weber's methodology as a social scientist
and, more specifically, a sociologist. In the tradition of the scientific method, Verstehen entails a certain neutrality, objectivity, and
dispassion. Weber was deeply interested in ferreting out 'the purpose or,intention behind people's actions. Sometimes this intention is fairly plain. Under these circumstances, intention may be
readily ascertained through the investigator's normal patterns of
thought and observation. At other times, actors behave in ways
that an observer may find difficult to comprehend using thought
patterns that are familiar to the observer. Indeed, the meaning
that an actor gives to her acts may be false according to the
norms held by the observer.' Particularly in this case, Weber
wishes the observer to shed her own values and assume a value
neutral position. In this way, the observer can truly understand the
acts of the subject being observed.
In his book about Weber, Professor Anthony Kronman describes the appropriate attitude for Verstahen as being "detached"
or "uncommitted." 9 According to Professor Kronman, achieving
this state requires suspending one's own values. Such suspension
requires a positive act of will.4" One might argue that this normative agnosticism suspends the observer's powers of understanding
remedies. Weber believed, however, that values are chosen as an
act of willing. The observer can separate her knowledge from the
value structure that she has chosen or willed.4 1 This separation is

36 THE OXFORD-DUDEN GERMAN DICTIONARY GERMAN-ENGLISH 772 (1990).
37 Weber's critique of these methods of dispute resolution would have certain parallels with a more recent critique by Owen Fiss. See Owen M. Fiss, Against &ttlement, 93
YALE LJ. 1073 (1984). Compare Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE LJ. 1660 (1985) with Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669 (1985).
38

MAX WEBER, THE INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL REALITY 28

1971).
39. KRONmA,
40
41

Id. at 22.
Id. at 21.

supra note 25, at 14-15.

(J.E.T. Eldridge ed.,
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necessary to achieve the detachment from the observer's own
values and to understand the values of her subject.
Verstehen extends beyond understanding the purposes and
intentions of an actor. Weber's sociology focuses on isolating individual purposive behavior. This is behavior oriented toward a particular end or idea, where the actor picks out the means or methods of achieving this end or idea.42
Weber understood that human behavior is more than the
product of the actor's intentions or purposes. Actors may be constrained by the actions of others, including those in preceding
generations. By understanding the context or milieu in which
purposive behavior occurs, however, the observer actually43may
understand the actor's behavior better than the actor herself.
Weber believed in cause and effect explanations of human
behavior. Part of the methodology of Verstehen entails a critical
explanation of history. Weber would critically look at events to
build an evidentiary understanding of what train of causality led to
a particular action." In some sense, his systematization of understanding behavior amounts to applying the scientific method to
the social sciences. He was not, however, so naive as to believe
that cause and effect in the social sciences follows in the same way
as the principles of classical mechanics order causality in the natural sciences. 45 Human behavior is constantly evolving new cultural
46
forms that defy such mechanical explanations.
One can understand human behavior as a series of decisions
to follow particular rules that in turn lead to a particular action.
Different degrees of regularity would correspond to different rules.
Moreover, there is the regularity with which one might attempt to
conform to a rule and the regularity with which one actually manages to conform to the rule despite outside impediments. 7 For
example, in his critique of Rudolf Stammler, Weber talks about a
rough sequence of rules that a worker follows in the process of
making decisions toward a particular end:
The "worker" has certain ideas in his head: he knows empirically that his food, clothing and heating "depend" on his utter-

42 Id. at 27-28.
43 See WEBER, supra note 38, at 32.
44 Id. at 28-29.
45 In modern physics, chaos and similar theories have replaced the routine explanations that events in the rational world repeatedly conform to a particular pattern.
46 See WEBER, supra note 34, at 65.
47 Id. at 4.
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ing certain formulae or giving other tokens of himself in the
"office" (such as are, customary for what the "jurists" call a
"labour-contract") and on his then also becoming a physical
part of that mechanism and so performing certain muscular
movements; he knows further that, if he does all this, he has
the chance of periodically receiving certain metal discs of a
specific form or pieces of paper, which, when placed in the
hands of other people, bring it about that he can take for
himself'bread, cabbages, trousers and so on and indeed that
the result will be that if anyone thereafter tries to take these
objects away from him again, there is certain probability that
men with spiked helmets will appear in response to his cries
for help and will assist him to regain possession of them. This
whole sequence of highly complicated trains of thoughts ...
can be counted on to exist in the workers' heads with a certain
probability and is taken into account by the factory owners as a
causal determinant of the cooperation of human muscle-power
in the technical process of production in exactly the same way
as the weight, hardness, elasticity and other physical properties
of the materials made up by the machines, and the
physical
4
properties of those by whom they are set in motion.
This quotation illuminates Weber's view that an actor follows
a series of rules that influence his actions. The actor may follow
the rules or maxims because they are normative in the sense that
he expects that all actors should follow them. Alternatively, the
actor may follow them as a means to a certain end because he
thinks that they will influence another actor to act in a particular
way.

49

For Weber, Verstehen is a method of sociological inquiry. He
did not conceptualize it as a means of advancing social policy."0
The goal of the sociologist is different from that of the dispute
resolver. Both are interested in understanding facts. However, the
sociologist pursues observation as an end in itself, while the dispute resolver seeks to understand the principles as a means to the
end of resolving the dispute.-"
Yet, of precisely what importance is Verstehen for the dispute
resolver? The answer may vary with both the type of dispute and

48

Id. at 101 (quoting MAX WEBER, GESAMMELTE AUFSATZE ZUR WISSENSCHAFr5LEHRE

(2d ed. 1951)).
49* Id. at 108-09.
50 Id. at 67.
51
e KRONMAN, supra note 25, at 14.
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the type of dispute resolver. For judges applying a body of substantive rules to established facts, Verstehen may often be less important or even unimportant. Weber himself would see such dispute resolution as a formal, rational application of law to facts.
Verstehen may be useful in discerning factual information, particularly if factors like the intention of one of the parties are at issue.
Even in this fact-finding context, however, Verstehen's requirement
that the judge suspend her own values during litigation is controversial. -One might take the position that a judge ought to be
detached and suspend her own value predilections. Some would
argue, however, that the judge's own values should always inform
her thinking about a case. Without attempting to resolve these
complex questions, I simply note that to the extent that one believes that the judge ought never put to one side her own values,
this view only adds another strong objection to a judge's use of
Verstehen. Regardless of how a judge should reference her own
values, she arguably ought not suspend, even for a short time, the
values enshrined in the legal principles governing a particular
case. These principles are filters that inform everything that the
judge does in connection with the case-from pretrial motions, to
fact finding, to final judgment. I only note these potential objections to the use of Verstehen by a judge; I do not attempt to resolve them.
Verstehen may be more useful for the arbitrator-in part because she has less searching fact-finding mechanisms than the
judge. Moreover, arbitration is sometimes contractually selected as
a method of dispute resolution, in part to preserve a long-term
relationship between the parties. Examples can include arbitration
of labor contracts between employers and employees, and arbitration between two parties to a long-term, commercial contract.
Under these circumstances, the arbitrator may use Verstehen to
understand the purposes of the parties in preserving a continuing
relationship and to adjudicate the dispute with a view toward preserving that relationship. As with judges, objections about arbitrators suspending the value commitments of governing legal principles may present themselves. The force of these objections may be
somewhat alleviated if the contract itself renders preservation of
the relationship a value with legal content that the arbitrator must
take into consideration.
Verstehen may be particularly appropriate for mediation and
negotiation. In these areas, the binding force of relevant legal
concerns may be somewhat relaxed, affording the parties the op-
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portunity to suspend not only their own value commitments, but,
also those of the law. Against this backdrop, the mediator might
attempt to better ascertain the positions of the competing party or
parties. Verstehen may be critically important for the mediator as a
trained neutral observer searching for common ground.
Mediators with substantive expertise in the area of the dispute
may have greater difficulty using this technique-for example, a
business person mediating a business dispute, or a family counselor mediating a family dispute. Mediators with expertise are often
attractive to parties. Their expertise affords them respect prompting the parties to listen to them. Moreover, mediators can sometimes apply their expertise to find solutions that the parties themselves may not have discovered. Employing Verstehen can greatly
benefit such mediators with expertise; using Verstehen, they can suspend the value commitments flowing from their expertise to thoroughly understand the respective positions of the parties. Without
such understanding, the mediator may have difficulty finding any
true common ground and may propose solutions that one or both
parties reject. At some point in the dispute resolution process, the
mediator should probably re-introduce' her substantive expertise to
advance and refine the fact-finding process. Expertise can help the
mediator to ask more penetrating questions, understand documents, and otherwise further the fact-finding process. Once she
understands the respective positions of the parties, a mediator with
substantive expertise can use this expertise to let the parties understand difficulties with their respective positions or propose solutions. While I have discussed the use of Verstehen by mediators,
similar points could apply to its use by negotiators, including those
with special expertise. Truly understanding the interests and limitations of the other party is often crucial to successful negotiation.
Using Verstehen in the dispute resolution process brings up
large ethical questions. As I have already indicated, dispute resolvers differ from sociologists in having to propose practical solutions
to problems. All dispute resolvers operate in a sea of legal and
ethical norms that impact to varying degrees on analyzing conflicts. For example, the negotiator or mediator may be operating
against the backdrop of anticipated litigation or international sanctions. Therefore, when a negotiator or mediator uses the methodology of Verstehen, she must understand that this technique can at
most be one stage in the dispute resolution process. Mediators
and negotiators may suspend only for a time the value commitments of the substantive legal and ethical principles that they
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understand to be applicable. Eventually, such principles should
inform a solution to the dispute. This is particularly true if such
legal and ethical principles protect the common good, that is, the
interests of members of the larger society who are not parties to
the negotiation or mediation. Such principles may also protect the
interests of each party to the dispute from being unwittingly trampled.
The Verstehen process of discovering what is at issue in the
dispute may influence what legal and ethical principles mediators
and negotiators deem relevant to resolving those issues. However,
in preferring particular ethical or legal principles in this determination, they should recall the Categorical Imperative of Immanuel
Kant and not select a solution that effectively uses one of the
parties or another group merely as a means to achieving a solution.5 2 This guiding principle should inform not only the substantive resolution of a dispute, but also the procedural methods employed."5 Conflict resolution, ought not resort to gamesmanship
that fails to respect the rights or humanity of the participants or
other groups.
Onora O'Neill demonstrates the real limits of instrumental
rationality in protecting such rights in the dispute resolution process.54 Her Essay in this Symposium, illuminates the necessity for
some principled rudder, such as the Categorical Imperative. Some
may argue that such a principled approach to dispute resolution is
not always possible.5" Again, such questions are large ones for
this brief Essay. Let me at least say that Kant intended the Categorical Imperative to be exactly what its title suggests, a universal
rule. If one can put forward instances in dispute resolution where
it ought not apply, they, at a minimum, should be a last resort.
My assertion here is only that the Categorical Imperative, and
other value commitments regarding the substance of the dispute,

52 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF ETHICS 40 (J. Semple trans., 1869). Although there are several formulations of the Categorical Imperative, the one to which I
specifically refer is: "So act as that humanity, both in thy own person and that of others,
be used as an end in itself, and never as a mere means." Id. Kant's four other formulations of his Categorical Imperative are summarized in HERBERT J. PAITON, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 129 (1948).
53 See John B. Attanasio, A Duty-oriented Procedure in a Rights-oriented Society, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 597 (1988).
54 See Onora O'Neill, Practical Reasoning and Dispute Resolution, 67 NOTRE DAME L.

REv. 1365 (1992).
55 See Thomas M. Franck, Is Justice Relevant to the InternationalLegal System?, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 945 (1989).
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ought to be suspended for a time during mediation and negotiation to make the process more likely to succeed. This does not,
on the basis of utility in achieving true understanding of a party's
position, permit manipulation, harassment, and other procedural
techniques that fail to respect the parties to the dispute. My use
of Verstehen only relaxes one's imposition of the Categorical Imperative on another party. It does not relax one's own obligations to
continue to observe the Categorical Imperative to respect the
rights and humanity of others throughout the dispute resolution
process.
III.

THE SYMPOSIUM

In this Symposium, we are privileged to feature a group of
internationally renowned scholars to discuss the topic of dispute
resolution. The Symposium combines the talents and resources of
three different groups, the Notre Dame Center for Civil and Human Rights, the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace
Studies, and the Notre Dame Law Review.
The intellectual quest of the Symposium is to explore methodological and value questions underlying dispute resolution. We
have invited scholars who are interested in these theoretical questions and who represent diverse styles and realms of dispute resolution. The categories of participants include internationalists,
judges, philosophers, and mediators. We have purposely sought to
bring together people who do not normally talk with each other
to see if they can glean new perspectives. Specifically, we brought
together Dayle E. Spencer, 'Director of the Conflict Resolution
Program at the Carter Center; Roger Fisher, the Samuel Williston
Professor of Law at Harvard Law School; Douglas M. Johnston,
Executive Vice President and the Chief Operating Officer of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies; Jorge Correa, former dean of the School of Law at Diego Portales University in
Santiago, Chile; Peter Wallensteen, the Dag Hammarskjold Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, Sweden;
Onora O'Neill, an ethicist and Principal of Newnham College,
Cambridge; and Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Senior Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and Chairman of the
Federal Courts Study Commission.
Dayle Spencer and Honggang Yang depict a mediation case
study, focusing on the assistance of the Carter Center's International Negotiation Network in resolving Ethiopia's "forgotten war"
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with the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front. They indicate that
these types of "intra-national" conflicts are the next challenge for
dispute resolution, and that a successful approach will be interactive and flexible.
Roger Fisher seeks to develop a working theory for solving the
problem of ineffective dispute resolution (war, strikes, drawn-out
litigation). He proposes a result-oriented approach to mediation,
focusing not on making the outcome conform to "objective" normative principles, but on accommodating the goals and internal
ground rules of the parties.
Douglas Johnston attempts to establish guidelines for approaching the resolution of conflicts in which religion is a factor.
Surveying situations in Northern Ireland, Mozambique, Sri Lanka
and the Punjab, he advises mediators of such disputes to emphasize common ground without threatening the singularity and dignity of the religions involved.
In his critical look at courtroom adjudication, Judge Joseph
Weis asks whether its process and remedies remain effective. He
concludes that courts with interpretive authority and enforcement
power serve a unique and necessary function, but could more
promptly and justly resolve conflicts given more sensitively crafted
procedures and substantive law.
Jorge Correa explores the unique dispute resolution challenges faced by new democratic governments in addressing the human
rights violations of predecessor dictatorships. He suggests that
where full criminal sanctions are politically infeasible, total disclosure of the truth can aid in establishing the society's disapproval
of past horrors, in healing the dignity of the victims, and in effecting the reconciliation necessary for effective transition.
Peter Wallensteen outlines emerging patterns of armed conflict and the resultant developments for conflict resolution. He
sees the end of the Cold War causing a shift to smaller, ethnic or
religious internal conflicts, giving rise to more international thirdparty dispute resolution organs.
Onora O'Neill discusses the distinct limits of instrumental
rationality in contributing to the resolution of disputes. Ultimately,
to resolve the most intractable disputes requires the construction
of points of agreement by an enterprise that moves beyond instrumental rationality to encompass such enterprises as re-education.
IV.

CONCLUSION
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In this brief Essay, I have tried to illustrate the efficacy of a
constrained form of Verstehen to help advance dispute resolution
methodology. I only give an impressionistic account of Verstehen. I
am not trying to develop anything approaching an account of this
complex concept that may-be used by dispute resolvers. Indeed, I
am only attempting to give some flavor of the idea to convince
dispute resolvers of its potential usefulness and to inspire further
exploration. I also try to urge some caution in transplanting .this
sociological concept into the realm of dispute resolution.
I wish to thank all those associated with the Center for Civil
and Human Rights, the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International
Peace Studies, Notre Dame Law School, and the Notre Dame Law
Review who made this Symposium possible. The tireless efforts of
the students of the Notre Dame Law Review in organizing this and
other symposia have been truly remarkable. I would also like to
thank the distinguished participants who presented papers, moderated sessions, and otherwise contributed to this conference. I only
hope that the printed page begins to convey the sense of intellectual excitement that they brought to this gathering. Finally, as I
leave Notre Dame, I would like to pay special tribute to my collaborator in this enterprise, Rev. William Lewers, C.S.C., for his wise
counsel, gentle spirit, and his smile.

